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Abstract—Bitcoin’s enormous success has inspired the devel-
opment of alternative blockchains, such as consortium chains.
Several cross-chain protocols have been proposed as ways of
connecting these universes of individual blockchains in a dis-
tributed and secure manner. In this paper, we present Niji, a
new cross-chain protocol that allows parties to perform virtual
Bitcoin payment securely on a consortium chain, without any
trusted third-party or mediators. Our work focuses on the issue
that it is difficult for a consortium chain’s token to hold a stable
market value, and Niji makes it possible for smart contract
services to acquire means of payment in the consortium chain.
With the Bitcoin payment channel built on the consortium chain,
the process from payment to service provision runs autonomously
without any interaction between parties. Niji introduces the
concept of a transaction template to validate Bitcoin payments
efficiently on different blockchains, and it allows a service
provider to delegate all of its tasks for verifying state updates to a
smart contract on the consortium chain. We also propose a novel
bi-directional payment channel adapted for design of the Niji
protocol, which can update payments non-interactively between
parties. We implemented a prototype of the Niji protocol and
conducted an experiment measuring the computational cost and
latency that demonstrates the protocols feasibility on practical
platforms.
I. INTRODUCTION
Bitcoin is the most popular and successful cryptocurrency.
Although Bitcoin has the largest market cap and holds a high
volume of transactions per day, its growth as a currency has
been gradual compared with its overheated growth as a specu-
lative instrument. Bitcoin offers a lot of peer-to-peer payment
opportunities, but its potential in most business use cases has
not been fully realized. On the other hand, looking at the
blockchain underlying Bitcoin, its technologies have attracted
a great deal of attention from businesses, governments, and
researchers.
The blockchain, a decentralized data management mecha-
nism featuring tamper resistance, high availability, and data
transparency, is expected to be a backbone of various com-
mercial services besides those of the finance sector [1]. Smart
contracts, a new way to automate the execution of business
work flows and their objective validation, has accelerated the
evolution of blockchains into distributed application platforms.
Smart contracts make blockchains suitable for a wide range
of applications such as supply chains [2], medical records [3],
online voting [4], IoT platforms [5], transportation systems
[6], and energy trading [7].
Indeed, while blockchain technology has already had a
significant impact on society and business, there are many
challenges still to be addressed. In particular, its industrial
applications have limitations. Even though most enterprise
applications require data privacy, transaction scalability, data
reversibility, and protocol update-ability, these controls are
not implemented on public blockchains such as Bitcoin and
Ethereum.
A consortium blockchain (referred to as a “consortium
chain” after this), a type of blockchain whose consensus
process is controlled by predetermined authorities, has been
developed for tackling the challenges mentioned above. In
particular, some groups of financial institutions and enter-
prises (e.g., Hyperledger Project, Ethereum Enterprise Al-
liance, and R3) have focused on developing implementations
of blockchain platforms and modules for consortia. A number
of companies have demonstrated proof-of-concept projects
utilizing these platforms for enterprise use cases, to learn about
the technology and its potential influence in their marketplaces.
However, there is still a major challenge to overcome
before consortium chains can reach mass market levels of
penetration [8]. That is, “payment” in a consortium chain
is an opaque process, and it causes a problem affecting
governance of the consortium. This is distinctly different from
a public blockchain, which has a settlement function using
cryptocurrency. Public blockchains are open for anyone to use
and, thus, they gain some network effects by using common
tokens for so many entities [9]. These tokens can be used
directly for end-to-end payments between parties, and it is
possible to exchange different assets efficiently. On the other
hand, although consortium chains may also have tokens, in
most cases, they hold no market value. One way to add
valuable tokens to a consortium chain is to have external
authorities (e.g., banks) ensure their value; in such case,
final settlement is done via authorities outside the blockchain.
The trouble is that the existence of a concentrated authority
detracts from the advantages of blockchain technology such as
transparency. Here, an ICO (Initial Coin Offering), a type of
crowdfunding using cryptocurrency that many startups prefer,
is an alternative way to make tokens valuable, but it is
challenging for most businesses to make use of one because of
legal complications and high costs associated with the process.
Another, more innovative and decentralized way is utilizing
a cross-chain protocol to transfer the value of assets in the
public blockchain to tokens of the consortium chain. There
are several cross-chain solutions to address interoperability
and scalability issues. The one type of cross-chain is to place
trust in validator nodes such as Federated sidechain [10],
Cosmos [11], and Polkadot [12]: the other is to have individual
participants themselves watch for fraud on blockchains, like in
AtomicSwap [13] and Plasma [14]. In any case, the common
premise is that the value of assets in the main chain are
transferred to tokens in another chain.
This paper presents Niji, a novel cross-chain protocol that
supports atomic and secure payment on a consortium chain
without any authorities. The key difference from previous
cross-chain solutions is that our protocol does not transfer
value to the consortium chain. Instead, by utilizing a payment
channel, the protocol enables virtual Bitcoin payments on the
consortium chain by verifying payments with smart contracts.
Our solution is simple, yet can be easily introduced, and
it is practical in the context of the consortium. Since the
protocols of each chain are logically decoupled, there is no
need to maintain a large and complex system of cooperation,
which leads to significant cost savings. The consortium can
focus on service operations rather than economic issues. In
addition, from the perspective of Layer 2, our contribution
scales opportunities to use bitcoins by enabling execution of
secure off-chain Bitcoin payments on diverse blockchains.
This is different from the approach of forming one network
like Lightning, but it will be possible to use Bitcoin payment
in the various universes of individual blockchains.
Outline: Section II introduces the elements necessary to
understand the rest of this article. Section III contains a
detailed description of the basic Niji protocol using a uni-
directional payment channel. The extension to a bi-directional
channel is shown in section IV. Section V analyzes the
security of the Niji protocol and its feasibility through an
experimental implementation. We compare Niji with other
cross-chain protocols and discuss possible extensions of this
protocol in section VI and end this paper in section VII.
II. BUILDING BLOCKS
This section establishes the necessary building blocks for
understanding the Niji protocol. In the following, we introduce
payment channels, which are techniques for Bitcoin off-chain
payment; then we describe the Ethereum Virtual Machine with
which the arbitrary code of smart contracts is executed.
A. Payment Channels
The payment channels achieve end-to-end secure payment
for off-blockchain trading. Niji utilizes a payment channel as a
sub-protocol on the cross-chain protocol. The simple payment
channel that was first discussed by Hearn and Spilman [15]
allows a payer to send a payee numerous payments without
committing all of the transactions to the blockchain. The
channel is essentially uni-directional; that is, the payer can
send bitcoins to the payee, but the payee cannot send in the
opposite direction. In a simple payment channel, only two
transactions are stored in the blockchain: a funding transaction
and a settlement transaction. The funding transaction is used to
open the channel. The transaction deposits a payer’s bitcoins
into a 2-of-2 multi-signature account managed by the payer
and payee. Conversely, the settlement transaction is used to
close the channel. It eventually performs the transfer of funds
on the blockchain and settles the balances of the payer and
the payee.
While the channel is open, the payer can update his/her pay-
ment multiple times within the range of funds deposited in the
multi-signature account. For example, in a first-time payment,
the payer creates and signs a transaction that transfers 0.1
BTC to the payee from 1 BTC of the multi-signature account.
Next, in a second payment to send the remaining 0.4 BTC,
the payer creates another transaction that sends 0.5 BTC to the
payee and updates the state of the channels. The payer cannot
broadcast any of those transactions to the Bitcoin network,
since these transactions do not have the required signature
of the payee. In this paper, we refer to such an incomplete
transaction as an update transaction, which specifies a funding
transaction as input and includes only the signature of the
payer. To transfer funds from the multi-signature account, the
transaction requires signatures of both the payer and payee.
Therefore, only the payee has the right to sign and broadcast
the last state of the channel (i.e., settlement transaction with
0.5 BTC) at an arbitrary timing. To protect the payer from the
risk that the payee does not respond and does not cooperate by
broadcasting any state of the channel, a time-lock that refunds
the whole 1.0 BTC to the payer is applied to the output’s script
of the funding transaction. There are two different types of
time-lock; CheckLockTimeVerify (CLTV), which is an opcode
specified in BIP65 [16], allows users to create a transaction
whose outputs are available until a concrete time in the future.
On the other hand, CheckSequenceVerify (CSV), introduced
in BIP112 [17], specifies a relative time. When a transaction
output including OP CSV is stored in the blockchain, it is
necessary to wait for the specified block confirmations until
the transaction is spendable again.
The simple payment channel described above is substan-
tially uni-directional; that is, the payer can send bitcoins to
the payee, but not in the opposite direction. In a bi-directional
channel, the flow can go both ways. There are two well-known
proposals for Bitcoin bi-directional channels. The first is called
Duplex Micropayment Channels, proposed by Decker and
Wattenhofer [18]. It achieves bi-directional payment channels
by using two uni-directional payment channels with a finite
lifetime. The second is Lightning Network by Poon and Dryja
[19], which allows the channel to remain open indefinitely,
relying on punishments to promote honesty among parties.
Moreover, regarding the existing solutions using payment
channels, there is an interactive process from payment to
service provision. For each payment, the payee must confirm
whether the channel state is valid. When receiving an update
transaction through an off-chain network, the payee must val-
idate the transaction format and verify the included signature.
Then, the payee can provide a service, say a WiFi hotspot
service. If the payment of the update transaction is invalid,
the provision will obviously be refused. Our solution, Niji, can
automate this verification process by using smart contracts on
the consortium chain.
B. Ethereum Virtual Machine
We assume that Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) is the
execution environment of consortium chain smart contract
in the Niji protocol implementation. EVM executes ordinary
transactions and treats smart contract bytecode as a special
transaction. Specifically, each smart contract is given its own
storage to keep the state of the contract. Our protocol can
run in other environments; however, we should emphasize
the utility of EVM from the following aspects. First, EVM
has been ported to several private blockchain platforms. The
blockchains released by various companies, open source com-
munities, universities, etc., currently have different technolo-
gies and frameworks, and market fragmentation is occurring
as a result. EVM was originally intended as a runtime envi-
ronment for smart contracts on the Ethereum platform, and
it has since been integrated into several blockchain platforms
for enterprise, such as Quorum, Monax, Hyperledger Burrow,
and Ethereum on Azure. In addition, go-ethereum, an official
Ethereum client of the Go implementation, can build a consor-
tium blockchain using a proof-of-authority algorithm (EIP225
[20]). These facts mean that EVM-based smart contracts can
run compatibly on multiple platforms, as described above.
As a second reason, EVM smart contracts are less flexible
than other Turing-complete smart contracts like Hyperledger
Fabric chaincode. There are trade-offs between the flexibility
that a platform provides and the security of the code which
developers write for it. EVM’s target is basically to provide
a “public” environment where arbitrary code of smart con-
tracts and other operations can be executed on the Ethereum.
Therefore, EVM inevitably has more restrictions on executions
of smart contracts than does a platform that is secure only
for closed environments. For example, the “gas system” is
a restriction to prevent eternal recursion and cycles, and it
encourages developers to write efficient code (the gas system
is described in section IV-A). Therefore, a protocol designed
to work only on EVM may also be able to run on other Turing-
complete platforms like Hyperledger Fabric.
III. NIJI PROTOCOL
The Niji protocol is essentially based on a Bitcoin payment
channel. As described in section II, payment channels come
in two types: uni-directional and bi-directional. For an intu-
itive understanding, we will first explain the uni-directional
channel-based protocol (the basic protocol) and then how it is
extended to the more practical bi-directional protocol.
A. Overview
Niji allows Bitcoin payments within the payment channel
to trigger automatic execution of the service deployed on the
consortium chain. To achieve this, the payee does not locally
verify an update transaction received from the payer; instead,
the EVM smart contract validates these in a consortium
chain. Niji provides an autonomous process from payment to
execution of a contract, without any mediators.
To begin with, let us identify the roles representing different
functionalities in the Niji system:
a) Networks: Each node of the Niji system has connections
to two blockchain networks: the Bitcoin blockchain and
a consortium blockchain. Unlike Bitcoin, the consortium
TABLE I
STRUCTURE OF TRANSACTION TEMPLATE
Field Value (example)
Version 02000000
Input count 01
Input [0] Previous output <funding tx hash>
Index <index of previous output>
Script only <redeemScript of previous
output> (no signatures)
Sequence FFFFFFFF
Output count 02
Output[0] Value nil
Script OP DUP OP HASH160
<service provider’s pubkey hash>
OP EQUALVERIFY OP CHECKSIG
Output[1] Value nil
(change given Script OP DUP OP HASH160
back to user) <user’s pubkey hash>
OP EQUALVERIFY OP CHECKSIG
Locktime 00000000
Hash Type 01000000
chain network restricts unauthorized access to the network
for secure transactions. In this network, nodes do not need
to be block generators (i.e., a member of a consortium
authority, like a bitcoin miner), but they need to have the
right to read and write data (i.e. issue transactions) to the
blockchain.
b) Nodes: The user and service provider represent the parties
in this protocol. The user is a payer node which pays
bitcoins to the service provider for usage of the services
operated on the consortium chain. The user makes Bitcoin
payments which trigger execution of a smart contract on
the consortium chain while the payment channel is open.
The last state of payments is broadcasted as a settlement
transaction by the service provider and is eventually stored
in the blockchain. The service provider is a payee node
with the intention to earn money by providing some
kind of service (e.g., sharing a resource like energy for
microgrids [7]) on the consortium chain. The service
provider creates a service contract for providing the service
and shares it via the consortium chain. It receives a Bitcoin
payment from the user as the usage fee of this contract via
the Niji protocol.
c) Smart Contracts: Two smart contracts are deployed on
the consortium blockchain. The bridging contract has
functions to manage the user’s payments instead of the
service provider doing so. It receives payments and vali-
dates them; then, it invokes the service contract’s function.
The service contract has an interface to invoke the core
functionality of the service, and the interface is opened for
the bridging contract. The two contracts are created and
deployed on the consortium blockchain before beginning
the Niji protocol.
The protocol itself is designed as follows. The core idea is to
automate the process of updating a payment non-interactively.
This is achieved using incomplete Bitcoin transactions, which
Fig. 1. Overview of the Niji Protocol. Starting on the left, a user commits to a payment to the bridging contract three times (i = 0, 1, 2). Straight solid lines
with arrows represent sending transactions to the blockchain networks. Straight dashed lines with arrows represent retrieving data from the blockchains.
we name transaction templates, where information on the
remittance amount and signatures are missing. The service
provider registers a transaction template to the bridging con-
tract during the setup phase and publishes it on the consortium
chain in advance. Table I shows an example of a transaction
template. For simplicity, the example uses a non-Segwit (Seg-
regated witness) transaction. (Segwit version is described in
Appendix A.)
When making a payment, a user creates a signature corre-
sponding to the payment referring to the transaction template
and submits only the signature and remittance amount to the
bridging contract. The bridging contract verifies the provided
signature on behalf of the service provider and validates the
payment by using the registered transaction template, user’s
signature, and remittance amount. If valid, the payment is
automatically approved, which means that the service provider
accepts the update transaction in the simple payment channel.
B. Protocol details
Figure 1 shows the three major phases of the Niji protocol
from setup to settlement. We describe each phase in the
following.
1) Setup: The setup involves opening the Bitcoin simple
payment channel and registering a transaction template in the
consortium chain. First, to open the typical simple payment
channel shown in section II-A, the user and service provider
create a 2-of-2 multi-signature address αm and broadcast a
funding transaction T f to the Bitcoin network. This trans-
action T f sends the user’s bitcoins to the multi-signature
accounts, where the amount is denoted as σf . For a refund on
T f , we use a relative time-lock by applying OP CSV [16] to
the multi-signature accounts; if the time-lock expires, the user
can securely return all deposits to his/her wallet. Then, the
user broadcasts a transaction CT (setDeposit(αm, σ
f , α˜u))
as proof of opening the channel, where CT (func) is a
consortium chain transaction calling a function of the bridging
contact. The function setDeposit(αm, σ
f , α˜u) stores deposit
information including the multi-signature address αm, deposit
amount σf in the consortium chain, and an address α˜u. Here,
α˜u is a special Ethereum-style address which is derived from
the Bitcoin public key. How α˜u is used for verification is
explained in the next subsection.
Next, after making enough confirmations (e.g., six confir-
mations), the service provider confirms that T f is stored in
the Bitcoin blockchain and generates a transaction template
T˜ , which is a deformed transaction lacking signatures and the
remittance amount. T˜ specifies T f as input and corresponds to
the complete transaction T σus, which represents a valid Bitcoin
transaction sending σ bitcoins from the multi-signature address
to the service provider’s address. The subscripts u and s
represent that T σus has the signatures of the user u and the
service provider s. T σus is a 5-tuple including T˜ as follows:
T σus = (T˜ , Sig
u, Sigs, σ, σc) (1)
where Sigu and Sigs are the respective signatures of u and
s, and σc is amount of change returned to u.
At the end of setup, the service provider broadcasts a trans-
action CT (setTmpl(T˜)) to the consortium chain network. A
function setTmpl(T˜) stores T˜ in the storage space of the
bridging contract on the consortium blockchain.
2) Payment: This phase allows the bridging contract to
validate each payment on behalf of the service provider. The
bridging contract has a function getT emplate() for retrieving
Algorithm 1 Updating a payment
1: procedure UPDATEPAYMENT(Sig, σ)
2: Obtain T˜ , α˜u, σ
f from contract storage;
3: fee← configured bitcoin transaction fee
4: Scon ← deployed service contract
5: σl ← 0 or latest remittance amount
6: if σl < σ and σ ≤ (σ
f − fee) then
7: modtx← SignatureForm(T˜ , σ)
8: h← Sha256d(modtx)
9: (v, r, s)← Sig
10: pk ← EcdsaRecover(h, v, r, s)
11: addr ← EthereumAddress(pk)
12: ⊲ Convert Bitcoin’s ECDSA public key to
Ethereum-style Address
13: if α˜u = addr then
14: s← true
15: result← Scon.invoke()
16: Save (Sig, σ) in contract storage;
17: return result
18: end if
19: end if
20: return fail
21: end procedure
the stored T˜ and a function update(Sig, σ) for updating the
signature value and the remittance amount. First, the user
obtains T˜ from the bridging contract by using getT emplate()
and validates it if its format is correct. Then, when making
a payment, the user provides the user’s signature Sigu and
σ for the bridging contract as a proof of payment using
update(Sig, σ). The user generates Sigu as follows:
modtx = SignatureForm(T˜ , σ) (2)
Sigu = EcdsaSign(sku, Sha256d(modtx)) (3)
modtx is the modified transaction form just before it is
signed, which is created by T˜ and σ, where the redeemScript
of T f is placed into modtx’s input and a hash type constant
is temporarily appended to the end. To generate signatures,
Bitcoin uses ECDSA (the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Algorithm) over the standard elliptic curve secp256k1, which
requires possession of the signing secret key sku and a sha256
double hash of modtx to be signed [21]. CT (update(Sig, σ))
is broadcasted to the consortium blockchain network by the
user and stored in the blockchain, and the bridging contract
validates its payment automatically. The validation includes
confirming whether the value of σ is under the value of σf
and verifying that the signature Sigu is correct. Algorithm 1
lists the pseudo-code of the payment updating process in the
bridging contract.
Verification: Verification of Sigu in the EVM implemen-
tation requires a little ingenuity. Since signature verification
using the native opcodes of EVM has too much overhead, we
use “precompiled contracts” [22], which allow complex cryp-
tographic computations to be used in EVM. A precompiled
Algorithm 2 Generating an update transaction
1: procedure GETUPDATETX()
2: Obtain T˜ , σi=k , Sig
s
i=k from contract storage;
3: ⊲ k is last increment number;
4: fee← configured bitcoin transaction fee
5: σc ← σf − σk − fee
6: T σu· = (T˜ , Sig
u, ·, σ, σc)
7: return T σu·
8: end procedure
contract is a specific pre-defined optimized function that runs
outside the EVM, but it can be called from a normal smart
contract that runs inside the EVM. EcdsaRecover, one such
precompiled contract, can verify an elliptic-curve signature
and recover its public key pk as follows:
EcdsaRecover(h, v, r, s) = pk (4)
where h is a 32-byte message to be signed, and (v, r, s) is
the ECDSA signature for the message (v is the recovery id,
a 1 byte value specifying the sign and finiteness of the curve
point [22]). This signature is compatible with a Bitcoin-style
signature which has a strict DER (Distinguished Encoding
Rules) format [23]; therefore, the public key pk is recovered
using h = Sha256d(modtx) and (v, r, s)u = Sigu through
EcdsaRecover. Finally, the verification is successful if the
Ethereum-style address converted from pk matches α˜u stored
in the bridging contract. Accordingly, Sigu can be verified
using T˜ , σ, and αu, which are registered in the bridging
contract. Here, the reason for the verification being done via an
Ethereum-style address is the specification of Solidity, a high-
level language for implementing Ethereum smart contracts.
(The verification process in Solidity is detailed in Appendix
B.)
Update payments: The total payment amount is updatable
multiple times up to the amount of σf that the user first
deposited. We denote σ and Sigu after update i as σi and
Sigui for i = 0, . . . , n. The user adds a new payment to the
current payment amount σi and replaces σi and Sig
u
i with
σi+1 and Sig
u
i+1 by broadcasting
CT (update(Sigui+1, σi+1)).
σi must be under σi+1 (σi < σi+1), since the payment channel
is uni-directional. This is checked in the bridging contract.
Triggering contract’s function: invoke(), a function of
the bridging contract, can call services provided by the ser-
vice contract. After validation of a payment, the bridging
contract executes invoke(), triggering the service contract’s
function corresponding to the payment. This process is an
internal communication between smart contracts that protects
nodes in the procedure. Thus, the procedure of transaction
CT (update(Sig, σ)) runs from payment to provision safely
and automatically.
3) Settlement: In the settlement phase, the service provider
obtains an update transaction from the bridging contract, signs
it, and broadcasts it to the Bitcoin network as a settlement
transaction. Algorithm 2 lists the pseudo-code of the bridging
contract. getUpdateTx(), a function of the bridging contract,
returns the update transaction T σu· (the service provider’s
signature is replaced with ·, which represents not yet signed) to
the service provider. After signing T σu· with its own secret key,
the service provider broadcasts the complete transaction T σus,
i.e., the settlement transaction for Bitcoin. Finally, the service
provider broadcasts a transaction CT (closing()) that makes
any further payments to the bridging contract unacceptable.
IV. NIJI WITH BI-DIRECTIONAL CHANNEL
The previous section described the basic specifications of
the Niji protocol using the simple payment channel. As men-
tioned there, the simple payment channel cannot send in the
opposite direction, which means that cancellation of payments
is not allowed. Security in the simple payment channels is
based on the fact that the recipient of payment does not have
an incentive to broadcast the old state of the channel; that
is, the latest update transaction always brings the maximum
benefit to the recipient. However, if a payment in the opposite
direction occurs, the recipient has an incentive to broadcast
the old state of the channel at any point in time. In the Niji
protocol, the service provider can broadcast and settle an old
update transaction any time, in spite that the parties have
agreed to cancel the payment.
Hence, to achieve secure cancellation, we considered using
Duplex Micropayment Channels (DMC) or Lightning Network
channels, both bi-directional channels, in the Niji protocol. In
DMC, since both parties create two uni-directional channels,
the service provider, as well as users, needs to deposit funds.
The drawback of using this design is if the service provider has
numerous customers, a large amount of money will be tied up.
On the other hand, the Lightning Network payment channel
requires both parties to exchange their signatures each time
a channel state is updated. This interactive process hinders
automation from payment to execution of a contract, one of
the advantages of Niji. Also, both parties have to monitor not
only the consortium chain but also the Bitcoin network to
prevent counterparty fraud.
To avoid the above problems, we propose a new non-
interactive channel design suitable for the Niji protocol. In
particular, to ensure autonomous blockchain cooperation, the
bi-directional channel is designed to meet the following re-
quirements.
Req. 1. The user can update their payment without interacting
with the service provider node.
Req. 2. The user is not required to monitor the Bitcoin
network and does not have to be on-blockchain at
all times.
Note that unlike other bi-directional channels, Niji’s bi-
directional channel takes into account the following special
consideration: almost all payments are from the user to the
service provider; transactions in the opposite direction occur
only a few times (such as cancellation of payment). The central
idea of our channel is to introduce this asymmetry in the pro-
cedures in each direction. Parties can update normal payments
non-interactively, but temporarily collaborate when canceling
Fig. 2. Examples of update transactions in our bi-directional channel between
user and service provider (SP). TL and HL are parameters for unlocking the
time-lock and hash-lock, respectively.
payments. Our channel is not completely bi-directional like
Lightning, but it is adequate for most of the targeted use cases.
In following subsections, we describe the separate channel
designs for normal payment and cancellation.
A. Payments in the normal direction
Our channel consists of three type of transaction: funding,
update, and settlement. In the normal direction of payment, the
channel acts like a simple payment channel. That is, in each
payment, the user increases his/her remittance amount and
never presents a remittance amount lower than the previous
amount. The update transactions have two outputs: the first
one specifies the remittance amount, and the second specifies
the amount of change given back to the user. The spending
output for the remitted amount is restricted by the following
additional conditions.
Condition 1: The spending of the output is restricted by a
time-lock. The service provider can unlock the script with its
signature only after a specified time-lock expires.
Condition 2: The spending of the output is restricted by
a hash-lock. The user can unlock the script with the hash’s
pre-image and its signature.
These conditions are expressed using a Bitcoin script, and
either condition is fulfilled by a script in the inputs of the next
transaction. Figure 2 shows examples of update transactions
that include these conditions in the first output. The examples
indicate that the user creates a new update transaction T 0.5u·
with the remittance amount increased from 0.3BTC to 0.5BTC.
The service provider can move the gained remittance to its
own wallet by using condition 1 in the first output. However, it
is impossible for the service provider to immediately fulfill the
condition as it is encumbered with the time-lock. It can obtain
the funds only after the time-lock expires. In the example
in Figure 2, TL is denoted as the time until the transaction
becomes spendable again; if TL = 110, it takes 110 blocks
from the point where the transaction occurred. The time-lock
gives the user a period for preventing any dishonesty on the
part of the service provider.
Condition 2 exists as a user’s countermeasure against be-
trayal by the service provider. The hash-lock requires the
subsequent input to include the corresponding pre-image (i.e.,
S0 in Figure 2) of the hash in order to be spendable. A hash
is passed to the user beforehand by the service provider, and
if the user obtains the pre-image of the hash, he/she can spend
the update transaction.
Now, with respect to the hash-lock, it should be noted that
the same pre-image S0 is reused before and after the update,
as shown in Figure 2. This is in stark contrast to the Lightning
payment channel, where the pre-images are recreated each
time a state is updated. In Lightning, both parties need to
exchange information including old pre-images and the hash
values of new pre-images to create the next update transaction;
thus they are required to interact with one another and to be
always online in the meantime. In the proposed channel in
Niji, it is not necessary to recreate new images each time the
state is updated. This satisfies the first requirement (Req. 1),
where interactions with parties are unnecessary, and it enables
the service provider to delegate its update processing to the
smart contract.
Additionally, the deadline of the time-lock TLu of an update
transaction is always set to be after the time-lock TLf of
a funding transaction. For example, if TLf is set to 100
blocks, TLu must be set to 101 blocks or later. These time-
lock settings definitely guarantee that the service provider
can not move the gained funds until the channel expires.
Therefore, the user does not have to monitor the Bitcoin
network continuously while the channel is alive in order to
be sure that the service provider has not committed fraud;
therefore, these restrictions result in the fulfillment of the
second requirement (Req. 2).
Now, let us describe how the above bi-directional channel
for normal payments is applied to the Niji protocol. In partic-
ular, it is achieved by adding constraints to the output of the
transaction template which is part of an update transaction.
Table II shows an example of a whole transaction template
and its output[0]’s redeemScript including condition 1 and
condition 2 in Figure 3. We will express the transaction
template T˜ as T˜ (TL,HL); therefore, the template having
the redeemScript shown in Figure 3 can be represented as
T˜ (110, S0). The procedure for a normal payment is no dif-
ferent from the basic Niji protocol described in section III,
except that the redeemScript must be shared with the user;
hence, we modify the setTmpl function from setTmpl(T˜) to
setTmpl(T˜(TL,HL), redeem), where redeem is a redeem-
TABLE II
STRUCTURE OF TRANSACTION TEMPLATE IN BI-DIRECTIONAL CHANNEL
Field Value
Version 02000000
Input count 01
Input [0] Previous output <funding tx hash>
Index <index of previous output>
Script only <redeemScript of previous
output> (no signatures)
Sequence FFFFFFFF
Output count 02
Output[0] Value nil
Script OP HASH160
<hash of redeemScript in Fig. 3>
OP EQUAL
Output[1] Value nil
(change given Script OP DUP OP HASH160
back to user) <user’s pubkey hash>
OP EQUALVERIFY OP CHECKSIG
Locktime 00000000
Hash type 01000000
OP IF
OP HASH160
<hash of S0>
OP EQUALVERIFY
<user’s pubkey>
OP ELSE
110 OP CSV
OP DROP
<service provider’s pubkey>
OP ENDIF
OP CHECKSIG
Fig. 3. Example of redeemScript in output[0]
Script corresponding to T˜ (TL,HL). Of course, the bridging
contract can verify the correctness of redeem, which includes
whether redeem is the same as the hash of output[0] script in
T˜ (TL,HL), whether the TL included in redeem is longer
than the number of blocks specified in TLf of a funding
transaction, and so on.
B. Cancellation in the opposite direction
Next, we describe how the protocol behaves in the opposite
direction, i.e., when payments are canceled. Unlike a normal
payment, several agreement operations between parties are
required to cancel payments. The user and service provider
need to interact with one another and exchange materials for
agreement on the cancellation. The key steps are as follows.
STEP1. The user sends a cancel request to the service
provider.
STEP2. The service provider creates a new pre-image and
returns the hash value of it.
STEP3. The user sets the received hash and submits a sig-
nature for the new update transaction.
STEP4. The service provider validates the user’s signature
and discloses the old pre-image of previous update
transaction.
Fig. 4. Example of update transactions for cancellation of payment in Niji
bi-directional channel. Even if the service provider broadcasts an old update
transaction, the user can get back the funds by using the disclosed pre-image
S0.
Fig. 5. Process for cancellation of payment in Niji protocol
With the completion of the above four steps, the cancellation
is deemed to be agreed upon by the parties. Afterwards,
the service provider can no longer broadcast the old update
transaction. Figure 4 shows that the old update transaction
is replaced with a new update transaction. The remittance
amount is reduced from 0.5BTC to 0.4BTC with a new pre-
image S1. If the service provider broadcasts an old update
transaction, the disclosed pre-image S0 allows the user to get
back all funds. (Techniques similar to this can be found in
HTLCs or Lightning Network.) Moreover, if the procedure
breaks down or terminates before the agreement, it can be
regarded that an agreement has not been reached. For example,
if the cancellation request is invalid, the service provider can
not respond to the user’s request.
The cancellation of payment operations is illustrated in
Figure 5. Here, it is paramount that all materials re-
quired for cancellation are exchanged via the consortium
chain. This is achieved by registering a new transaction
template which includes the hash value of a new pre-
image on the consortium chain (equivalent to STEP 2).
replaceTmpl(T˜(110, Sj+1), redeemj+1) replaces the exist-
ing T (110, Sj) and redeemj with a new T (110, Sj+1) and
redeemj+1 in the storage space of the bridging contract,
where the increment count j represents the number of can-
cellations. Then, the user makes Sigi+1 with the new amount,
which is the reduced remittance after cancellation, and regis-
ters Sigi+1 to the bridging contract via the update function
(equivalent to STEP 3). Finally, the service provider discloses
Sj via the canceled(Sj), which publishes the pre-image
of the previous update transaction on the consortium chain
(equivalent to STEP 4).
For secure trading, these procedures can be strictly validated
by using a smart contract on the consortium chain, i.e.,
a bridging contract, which prevents service providers from
broadcasting old update transactions. In addition, success
of cancellation in the contract can automatically trigger the
service contract’s functions such as revoke(), which reverts
the state back to one before the payment was canceled.
V. ANALYSIS
The new bi-directional payment channel for the Niji pro-
tocol enables autonomous cooperation between blockchains.
In the following, we analyze the assumptions of security and
evaluate the feasibility of our prototype.
A. Security
The security of the Niji protocol essentially depends on the
safety of the payment channel. Although different channels
may be applied to Niji in the future (see section VI-C), we will
consider the safety of only the bi-directional channel proposed
in this paper. In Niji, since the service provider always
broadcasts a settlement transaction, it has more discretion
when it comes to making the settlement in comparison with
the user. Therefore, the major security risk we consider is an
act of betrayal of the service provider. The service provider
could potentially behave dishonestly in three ways.
1. No settlement is made at all.
2. Despite that a cancellation was approved, the service
provider broadcasts an old update transaction.
3. The contract deployed by the service provider does not
run properly.
In the first case, the service provider abandons the protocol
itself and refuses to broadcast a settlement transaction within
the channel expiration. To prevent such a deadlock of funds,
the output script of a funding transaction allows the user
to return all deposits to his/her wallet after the funding
transaction’s time-lock expires; that is, the user can broadcast
the settlement transaction with only the user’s signature. The
second case is that the service provider does not broadcast
the latest channel state that reflects cancellation and instead
broadcasts an old channel state which has more incentives.
This fraud can be prevented by using the disclosed pre-image
at the end of the cancellation procedure, as described in the
previous section. With the user’s signature and disclosed pre-
image, the user can spend the output of a settlement transaction
under condition 2 described in section IV-A.
The third case is caused by an issue with the contract
itself rather than the operation of the payment channel. All
contracts in the Niji protocol, which include Bitcoin scripts
and smart contracts on the consortium chain, are provided by
the service provider. The user must confirm that the contract
is the expected one to ensure safety. Unlike conventional
cross-chains using an oracle outside of the blockchain, all
of our contracts are on a consortium chain and the entire
transaction history is shared among the participants sharing
the blockchain; therefore, it is possible for the user to re-
validate the state changes and observe whether the contract
works properly via the blockchain. In addition, as required by
the security level, it is assumed that a healthy consortium chain
network continues; hence in the consortium chain network,
the block creators are required to be honest and faithful to
the protocol; e.g., they are encouraged to use a consensus
algorithm with transaction finality like PoA and PBFT.
Incidentally, Plasma [14], a cross-chain framework that has
similar aspects to our approach, has precautions that involve
cooperation between blockchains; e.g., a child blockchain is
enforced to roll back by submitting proof of fraud to the parent
blockchain. In our approach, there is no close cooperation
between blockchains to solve the problem of fraud on the
consortium chain. Instead, the Bitcoin payment channel pro-
vides end-to-end security to users, which is logically separated
from the consortium chain. Our approach is simple, but has
the flexibility to connect to various consortium chains without
being bound by a specific specification. Niji can also be easily
combined with existing solutions to improve its abilities.
B. Feasibility
We evaluated the feasibility of the Niji protocol between
the Bitcoin test-net and an EVM-based consortium chain built
using the Ethereum client. The prototype was implemented
using the bitcoin-core client and go-ethereum client, which
supports clique proof-of-authority [20] as a consensus algo-
rithm for building consortium chains [24]. We placed four
nodes with authority to generate blocks in the Ethereum-
based consortium chain and changed the period of proof-of-
authority consensus from a default 15 seconds to 1 second
to get those blocks mined faster. The Bitcoin client is only
used to broadcast Bitcoin transactions between setup and
settlement. We confirmed that all Bitcoin transactions in the
Niji protocol were accepted into Bitcoin test network. In
this evaluation, we focused on the performance related to
consortium chain transactions. Additionally, to clarify only
the payment performance of Niji, we excluded measurements
related to service provision in the service contract.
1) Computational cost: The bridging contract coded by
Solidity, Ethereums most popular high-level language, exposes
several API calls to receive transactions. These operations
consume gas, the internal pricing used for executing operations
in the EVM. Each computation of the contract codes has an
TABLE III
GAS COST OF COMPUTATIONALWORK
Operation Gas cost (gas)
uni-directional bi-directional
Deploy bridging contract 1,785,044 2,562,757
Set deposit information 245,922 245,988
Set transaction template 285,183 431,100
Update payment 455,355 468,389
Replace transaction template - 431,164
Disclose pre-image - 53,687
Close channel 46,626 46,648
TABLE IV
TIME ANALYSIS OF OPERATIONS IN PAYMENT PHASE
Task Mean Maximum Minimum
Std.
Deviation
Get transaction template 116 454 101 18.0
Update payment 1981 2664 1112 252
Total 2097 2778 1218 253
associated cost in gas, protecting the blockchain network from
denial-of-service attacks with infinite loops and encouraging
efficiency in the code. The gas system is also useful on the
consortium chain in terms of forcibly terminating harmful
code execution, even if the gas itself has no value (i.e., users
need not pay for gas with crypto-currency) unlike in the
public Ethereum blockchain. In fact, Quorum, the EVM-based
consortium chain from JP Morgan, removes pricing of gas,
although the gas system itself remains [25].
The transaction gas costs of operations through the bridging
contract are listed in Table III. These values come within the
usual range found in a public Ethereum block, which has a
gas limit of approximately 8.0 million (in June 2018). The bi-
directional channel tends to require higher gas cost than the
uni-directional one for the management of the cancellation
procedure. When constructing the consortium chain, the gas
limit in each block and the amount of gas included in a
transaction should be adjusted with reference to these results.
In actual applications, since a payment calls the function of
the service contract automatically, the corresponding gas cost
for the service is added to the gas value of updating payment
shown in Table III.
2) Timing analysis: Table IV outlines the timing analysis
measurements for the payment phase in Niji with bi-directional
channel. All times are in milliseconds. We executed 1000
experimental runs and computed latency statistics including
the average (mean), maximum, minimum, and standard devi-
ation. All measurements were performed on a MacBook Pro
running OS X 10.13.4 equipped with four cores, 2.3GHz Intel
Core i5, and 16 GB memory. One payment operation was
divided into two tasks: getting the transaction template and
updating payment. “Total” is the end-to-end response time as
defined in one payment. We used Node.js as the measurement
environment of the Niji protocol to communicate with go-
ethereum and bitcoin-core. Each operation included not only
the processes in Node.js but also those in the EVM, such as
verifying a signature and parsing a transaction.
In the process of getting a transaction template, the user
never broadcasts transactions. Since data is only retrieved from
the blockchain, the process runs in a steady rate. On the other
hand, payment update, which has time ranges from 1121 ms
to 2664 ms, is clearly dominated by the consensus time, i.e.,
the time until the registered data is stored in a new block. In
this experiment, we set the parameter of the consensus time to
1 second; therefore, 2094− 1000 = 1094 ms is the overhead
for each payment. Although the payment can be updated many
times as long as the channel is open, a certain latency as above
is required for each payment. Therefore, services using the
Niji payment protocol must be designed with this constraint
in mind.
Moreover, although scalability is an aspect of performance,
it entirely depends on the throughput of the consortium chain
itself. The Niji protocol certainly contributes to an improve-
ment of the Bitcoin scalability, but the choice of consortium
chain platform may have a great effect on this aspect. In the
next section, we discuss possible extensions to Niji, including
ones aimed at scalability.
VI. DISCUSSION
Here, we compare Niji with other cross-chain protocols and
discuss possible extensions of the Niji protocol to a wide range
of future applications. These extensions could remain within
the basic Niji concept or be combined with existing solutions
to improve its abilities.
A. Comparison with related work
Several cross-chain protocols have been proposed for im-
proving scalability and interoperability. These approaches can
be classified into two types: utilizing intermediaries like a
federation or decentralized networks and directly connecting
blockchains with the cooperation of participates. The former
way has a premise that the participants place trust in the
intermediaries. Federated sidechain [10] relies on a federation
for honest activity and the federation controls multi-signature
locks to transfer coins between Bitcoin and the sidechain.
As more decentralized approaches, Cosmos [11] and Polka-
dot [12] have an inter-blockchain to relay data between
blockchains, respectively referred to as Cosmos hub and Relay
chain. The inter-blockchain is operated by incentivized nodes,
but the fact that participants rely on validators is similar to the
federation. Although these approaches certainly need to place
trust in intermediaries, their participants are less burdened,
as the intermediaries are responsible for the connections and
monitoring costs.
On the other hand, in the latter way, i.e., directly connecting
blockchains with the cooperation of participates, individual
participants themselves need to take precautions to prevent
fraud. Atomic swaps [13] (or atomic cross-chain trading) is the
exchange of one cryptocurrency with another cryptocurrency
between two parties, without the need to trust a third party.
The tokens are directly traded between users in a trustless
atomic manner, but both users must continuously monitor
the blockchains to create and broadcast the transaction syn-
chronously together, which places a burden on them. Plasma
is a powerful framework that makes smart-contract execution
scalable by associating block creations in the child blockchain
with the root Ethereum blockchain. This approach also re-
quires periodic commitments, i.e., submission of block headers
to the root blockchain. In addition, to prevent fraud, it is
necessary for users to constantly monitor both parent and child
chains; in general, the latter way tends to burden individual
participants.
Although Niji is classified as the latter sort of method, it
has a different aspect from other related work. The key idea is
that there is no value transfer of bitcoins to tokens of another
blockchain. In most of the related work, by bounding funds in
a particular contract, you can swap them with another token
that holds the same value as the bounded funds in another
blockchain. If another blockchain (i.e., consortium chain) fails
to work properly due to misconduct or fraud, funds will be not
protected at all, unless there is an incentivized and massive
mechanism protects the funds like in Plasma. By contrast,
in Niji, value transfer of bitcoins does not occur between
blockchains. Instead, the value of bitcoins can be used directly
and circulated on the consortium chain. Niji has no tight
cooperation between blockchains, but it achieves a simple and
flexible connection to another blockchain, which has certain
security based on the payment channel. Our protocol design
reduces the monitoring costs and its concept eliminates the
risk of price fluctuations in tokens. As an analogy, the U.S.
dollar can be used as legal tender in some countries where
either no local currency is issued or both the local currency
and US dollar coexist. “Dollarization” stabilizes the value of
the local currency, which leads to stabilization of prices and
the economy of the whole country; similarly, “Bitcoinization”
in consortium chains that built by startups or enterprises would
bring about stable development and growth for their services.
B. Niji in combination with other platforms
The Niji implementation described in this paper uses an
EVM-based consortium chain platform, and Bitcoin is the
only cryptocurrency supported. Of course, the Niji protocol
can easily be extended to other platforms, e.g., a combination
of Litecoin and Hyperledger Fabric if their requirements can
be satisfied. The requirement of available currency is to have
a scripting function similar to Bitcoin, that is, the currency
has a multi-signature address and the time-lock and hash-lock
functionalities. On the other hand, the choice of consortium
chain platform has a direct impact on the scalability of Niji
payments. Hyperledger Fabric has the ability to handle Turing-
complete smart contracts similarly to EVM-based platforms
and as well provides high throughput performance [26]. Since
the Niji protocol is designed to run even in restricted envi-
ronments like EVM, it may work on many consortium plat-
forms including Hyperledger. This would enable appropriate
platforms to be selected according to the use case.
C. Possible improvement with eltoo channel
Decker, Russell, and Osuntokun have proposed the eltoo
protocol [27] as another approach to realizing a simpler and
more efficient bi-directional channel. Unlike the Lightning
Network channel, this novel channel does not require penalty
branches. It thus reduces monitoring costs and overcomes the
problem of asymmetry of information that endpoints have.
The protocol works by overriding the previous state and
forces old transactions to be unavailable. eltoo introduces
the concept of state numbers, similar to sequence numbers
in the original Nakamoto implementation of Bitcoin. While
the original sequence numbers of the Nakamoto implemen-
tation were not enforceable, eltoo’s state numbers enforce
replacement of transactions by ensuring that a later state can
resume any of the previous states until the last settlement
transaction is confirmed. In order to achieve the replacement
mechanism, it is necessary to introduce a new sighash flag,
SIGHASH NOINPUT, which selectively marks transactions
that can be tied to previous transactions.
The eltoo protocol can be applied to Niji, because it does
not require interactive exchange of something to prevent
counterparty fraud when updating a payment. The main benefit
of using eltoo would be that it simplifies the cancellation
of payment procedure. In Niji, the state number is managed
by a smart contract, and the latest state always has priority
regardless of whether the money sent to the service provider
is increased or a payment is cancelled. The cancellation
procedure described in section IV-B requires four steps, but
with eltoo, it would be shortened to two steps: the user requests
to cancel a payment and then the service provider agrees to
it by submitting its signature. In addition, it is also possible
for the service provider to refund the user by unilaterally
submitting its signature.
In order to enable eltoo protocol on Niji, we need to modify
the template transactions slightly. The eltoo channel requires
two types of transaction, one for update and one for settlement,
and a settlement transaction always requires a new public
key pair. These features might entail modifications to the
verification process in the bridging contract. More importantly,
it is necessary that the eltoo protocol itself become available
in the Bitcoin protocol; that is, the new features that compose
eltoo, state numbers and SIGHASH NOINPUT, must be made
available in the Bitcoin blockchain infrastructure in the future.
VII. CONCLUSION
We presented Niji, a cross-chain protocol for atomic and
secure Bitcoin payment on a consortium blockchain. This
protocol provides a means of payment into a consortium chain
using the Bitcoin payment channel. The process autonomously
runs from payment to service provision with no need for
trusted third parties, and with no transfer of bitcoins to other
tokens. Our first implementation is designed to work on an
EVM-based consortium chain, and our experiments showed
the practical feasibility of the protocol. We discussed the
security of Niji as well as future extensions that could make
use of existing platforms to improve the functionality and
scalability of the protocol. These extensions could potentially
make payments on the consortium chain more flexible and
efficient for a wide range of applications.
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APPENDIX
A. Segwit templates
The transaction template must be modified if the Segwit
transaction is used. The modification introduces two types
of template: a Segwit transaction itself and a serialization
format for SignatureHash algorithm specified in BIP143 [28],
respectively shown in Table V and Table VI. The format
in Table VI is used as hash pre-image corresponding to the
signature included in the Segwit transaction, but its template is
missing hashOutputs field that requires sha256 double hash
of the serialization of output amount with scriptPubKey. When
updating a payment, the signature submitted by the user can
be verified by combing these templates.
TABLE V
STRUCTURE OF TRANSACTION TEMPLATE IN SEGWIT USE
Field Value (example)
Version 01000000
Marker 00
Flag 01
Input count 01
Input [0] Previous output <funding tx hash>
Index <index of previous output>
Script OP 0 <hash of witnessScript>
Sequence FFFFFFFF
Output count 02
Output[0] Value nil
Script OP 0
<service provider’s pubkey hash>
Output[1] Value nil
(change given Script OP 0
back to user) <user’s pubkey hash>
Witness count nil
Witness only <witnessScript for previous
output> (no signatures)
Locktime 00000000
TABLE VI
FORMAT TEMPLATE FOR SEGWIT SIGNATURE VERIFICATION
Field Value (example)
Version 01000000
hashPrevouts <32-byte hash of all outpoints>
hashSequence <32-byte hash of sequence of all inputs>
Outpoint <funding tx hash and index>
scriptCode <witnessScript>
Value of previous output <deposit amount of funding tx>
Sequence of input FFFFFFFF
hashOutputs nil
Locktime 00000000
Hash Type 01000000
B. Bitcoin signature verification on EVM
The verification of Bitcoin’s signature on EVM depends
on Solidity, a language of smart contracts in Ethereum.
The Solidity specification defines a precompiled contract
EcdsaRecover as follows:
ecrecover(bytes32 hash, uint8 v, bytes32 r,
bytes32 s) returns (address)
where the ecrecover function recovers an Ethereum address
associated with the public key from the elliptic curve signature.
As described in section III-B, to make a comparison with the
recovered Ethereum address, a Bitcoin public key correspond-
ing to the signature needs to be converted into an Ethereum-
style address. According to the Ethereum yellow paper [22], an
Ethereum address A(pr) (a 160-bit value) for a given Bitcoin
private key pr is computed as follows:
A(pr) = B96..255(KEC(BITCOINPUBKEY (pr))) (5)
where A(pr) is defined as the right-most 160 bits of the
Keccak hash of the corresponding Bitcoin public key; the
Bitcoin public key virtually is converted into an Ethereum
address.
Using the ecrecover function and virtual Ethereum address,
the verify function in a smart contract can be implemented
as follows:
function verify(bytes32 modTx, uint8 v,
bytes32 r, bytes32 s, address
convertedAddr) public pure returns(bool) {
bytes32 hash = sha256(sha256(modTx));
address Addr = ecrecover(hash, v, r, s);
if(Addr == convertedAddr) return true;
else return false;
}
The verify function receives an unsigned transaction
modTx, signature parameters (v, r, s), and convertedAddr
from the Bitcoin public key, and it outputs the results of the
verification. In the Niji protocol, this verification process is
included in the bridging contract.
